Existence of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms in models with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values is possible when there are no consumption externalities. An ex post incentive compatible mechanism is constructed in a model where a single indivisible object is allocated among several buyers with multi-dimensional information and interdependent values. It is the combination of informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) and consumption externalities, rather than informational externalities alone, that leads to non-existence of ex post equilibrium when agents have multi-dimensional signals. As ex post equilibrium has been employed mostly in models with private goods, this is not a significant limitation.
Introduction
In models of mechanism design with interdependent values, each player's information is usually modeled as a real number. While this is convenient, it might not capture a significant element of the setting. For instance, suppose that agent A's reservation value for an object is the sum of a private value, which is idiosyncratic to this agent, and a common value, which is the same for all agents in the model. Agent A's private information consists of an estimate of the common value and a separate estimate of his private value. As other agents care only about A's estimate of the common value, a single dimensional statistic will not capture all of A's private information that is relevant to every agent (including A).
1 Therefore, it is essential to test whether insights from the literature are robust to relaxing the assumption that an agent's private information is a real number. This research agenda has been pursued in two important papers by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2004) . Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that if agents have multi-dimensional information, interdependent values, and independent signals then, unlike in models with single dimensional information, every Bayesian Nash equilibrium is inefficient.
2
Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2004) call into question the existence of ex post equilibrium when agents have multi-dimensional information. They show that in a model with two players and two outcomes, ex post incentive compatible mechanisms do not generically exist (except, of course, trivial mechanisms which disregard the reports of players). Jehiel et al. claim that this non-existence result generalizes to any mechanism design setting that has at least two players and two outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to show that ex post equilibrium exists in a wider class of models with multi-dimensional signals than might seem possible. In particular, Jehiel et al.'s theorem does not rule out existence in settings with private goods. The Jehiel et al. result depends on the assumption that neither agent is indifferent between the two outcomes; its extension to many players and outcomes depends on the assumption that for any pair of outcomes there exist at least two players who are not indifferent between that pair of outcomes. These assumptions are not tenable in private goods economies, i.e., when there are no consumption externalities. Consider 1 A d-dimensional, d ≥ 2, private signal s A can be mapped without any loss of information into a single dimension using a one-to-one function f : d → . However, agents' values will not be nondecreasing in the signal f (s A ). Hence, the assumption of single dimensional signals is a limitation only in conjunction with the assumption (commonly made in the literature) that signals are ordered so that a higher realization is more favorable.
2 Postlewaithe & McLean (2004) show that efficient Bayesian implementation is possible when signals are correlated.
the allocation of one indivisible object to two buyers, 1 and 2. There are three possible outcomes: a i , the good is assigned to buyer i, i = 1, 2, and a 0 , neither gets the good. Buyer 1 is indifferent between a 2 and a 0 and buyer 2 is indifferent between a 1 and a 0 . Therefore, even if buyers have multi-dimensional signals, the possibility that there exists a non-trivial selling mechanism in which truth-telling is ex post incentive compatible for the buyers is not precluded. What is ruled out by Jehiel et al.'s theorem is the existence of a non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanism with outcomes a 1 and a 2 only, as neither buyer is indifferent between these two outcomes.
We prove by construction an existence result for ex post incentive compatible mechanisms for the sale of a single indivisible object to n buyers with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. In the construction, the rule for deciding whether some buyer A should be assigned the object is as follows. Fix the other buyers' signals at some realization. Partition buyer A's set of possible signal realizations into equivalence classes such that A's reservation value is constant on an equivalence class. These equivalence classes are completely ordered by the buyer A's value. If (a generalization of) the single crossing property is satisfied then there exists a pivotal equivalence class with the property that it is ex post incentive compatible to award the object to buyer A if and only if A's signal is in an equivalence class which is greater than the pivotal one. If he wins, the price paid by A is equal to his value in the pivotal equivalence class (which is also equal to the maximum of other buyers' values on A's pivotal equivalence class).
3 This mechanism is non-trivial if the efficient allocation rule is non-trivial.
There are no consumption externalities in our model. Thus, it is the combination of informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) with consumption externalities, rather than informational externalities alone, that lead to non-existence of ex post equilibrium when agents have multi-dimensional signals. As ex post equilibrium has been employed mostly in models with private goods, this is not a significant limitation.
4
The paper is organized as follows. A model with two buyers is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we construct an ex post incentive compatible mechanism in an example from Jehiel et al. and illustrate why their theorem does not imply nonexistence in economies with private goods. An existence result for ex post incentive compatible mechanisms is proved in Section 4. This result is generalized to n buyers in Section 4.1.
The model
The main idea can be seen in a model with two buyers and one indivisible object.
The buyers' signals are denoted s = (s 1 , s 2 ) with domain S = S 1 × S 2 . We also refer to s as an information state. Bidder i's valuation is V i (s i , s j ) (also denoted V i (s)). Buyers have quasilinear utility. If buyer i gets the object in state s and pays t, then his utility is V i (s) − t; if he does not get the object and pays t, his utility is −t.
Denote by a i , i = 1, 2, the outcome in which buyer i is allocated the object. The outcome in which no buyer gets the object is denoted a 0 . A (deterministic) mechanism consists of an allocation rule h and two payment functionst i , i = 1, 2. The allocation rule h : S → {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } is a function from the buyers' reported signals to an allocation of the indivisible object to either no buyer or buyer 1 or buyer 2; the payment functiont i : S → is a function from the buyers' reported signals to a money payment by buyer i. A mechanism is ex post incentive compatible if for i = 1, 2, i = j,
∀s i , ∀s i , ∀s j (1) where 1 A denotes the indicator function of the event A. In other words, at each information state if buyer j truthfully reports his signal then buyer i can do no better than truthfully report his signal.
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It is well-known that ex post incentive compatibility implies that the money payment made by buyer i depends on (i) whether or not buyer i is assigned the object and (ii) buyer j's reported signal, j = i. Further, we restrict attention to mechanisms in which a buyer pays nothing if he does not get the object; that is,t i (s i , s j ) = 0 if h(s) = a i .
6 Consequently, we write the money payment function aŝ
The function t i (s j ) is buyer i's payment conditional on getting the object. We interpret t i (s j ) as a personalized price at which the object is available to buyer i. Condition (1), the requirement for ex post incentive compatibility, may be rewritten as follows for mechanisms in which losing buyers pay nothing. For i = 1, 2, i = j,
A pair of personalized price functions
That is, in each information state at most one buyer's value exceeds his personalized price. An allocation rule implements an admissible pair of prices t 1 , t 2 if the rule assigns the object to a buyer if and only if the buyer's value exceeds his personalized price. That is, the allocation rule
implements the admissible pair t 1 , t 2 . Clearly, h is a feasible allocation rule in that it does not allocate more than one object. Observe that a buyer cannot change his personalized price by lying about his private signal, as each buyer's price depends only on the other buyer's (reported) signal. At each information state (s i , s j ), the mechanism (h, t) allocates the object to buyer i for a payment of t i (s j ) if and only
Suppose that the information state is (s i , s j ) and buyer i reports s i = s i . If he gets the same allocation at (s i , s j ) and (s i , s j ) then the lie is not profitable. Therefore, suppose that h(
and with a report of s i buyer i buys at a price at least as large as his value for the object. Similarly, if h(s i , s j ) = a i and h(s i , s j ) = a i then with a report of s i he ends up not buying the object at a price strictly less than his value. Thus, (h, t) satisfies (2) (and 1) and is ex post incentive compatible. We have Lemma 1: If an allocation rule h implements an admissible pair of personalized prices t = (t 1 , t 2 ) then the mechanism (h, t) is ex post incentive compatible.
A mechanism is non-trivial if there exist two distinct outcomes, each of which is implemented at a positive (Lebesgue) measure of information states by the mechanism.
It is possible to satisfy (3) by choosing personalized prices so high that each buyer's valuation is always less than his personalized price. Such prices lead to the trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanism in which h(s) = a 0 , ∀s. In Section 4, we show that under reasonable conditions on buyers' information, there exists an admissible pair of personalized prices which is implemented by a non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanism. In particular, each of the outcomes a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 occur at a positive measure of information states. First, we illustrate a non-trivial mechanism in an example.
An example
The following example is from Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2004) . Contrary to their claim, this example has a (continuum of) non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanism(s).
Example 1: Two buyers compete for a single indivisible object. Each gets a pair of
, where we use the fact that c
Consequently, personalized prices p 2 + c 2 2 for buyer 1 and p 1 + c 2 1 for buyer 2 are admissible, that is they satisfy (3).
Using (4), define an allocation rule which implements these prices. In this mechanism, the buyers report their private signals to the mechanism designer. The mechanism designer allocates the object to buyer i for a payment equal to his personalized
. By Lemma 1, this mechanism is ex post incentive compatible.
Let h −1 (a i ) be the set of information states which are mapped on to a i by this allocation mechanism. Each of the sets
is of positive measure. Hence, the mechanism is non-trivial.
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The boundary between the sets h −1 (a 1 ) and h −1 (a 2 ) is:
where A is the closure of set A. This boundary is a one dimensional set and the projection (onto buyer i's signal space) of boundary points with a fixed value of buyer j signal (p j , c j ) = (p, 0) is the single point (p i , c i ) = (p, 0). We shall return to this below.
There exists a continuum of non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanisms in this example. Consider personalized prices (3), so do the prices t i (p j , c j ). An allocation rule that implements t 1 , t 2 is ex post incentive compatible. For small enough i (p j , c j ), this mechanism is non-trivial.
We summarize the main result of Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2004) . Consider a setting with two agents, 1 and 2, and two outcomes, a 1 and a 2 . Each agent i gets a d i -dimensional signal. Define µ i (s), i = 1, 2, to be the difference between i's utility for outcomes a 1 and a 2 .
8 The domain of signals, S, is shown schematically in Figure 1a . Any allocation rule partitions S into two subsets, depending on whether h(s) = a 1 or h(s) = a 2 . The boundary between these two sets is the broken line in Figure 1a . Jehiel et al. show that for any non-trivial allocation rule (i) the projection of points on this boundary with fixed value of s j onto the domain of i's signals, S i , i = 1, 2, is a d i − 1 dimensional submanifold 9 and (ii) for any ex post incentive compatible allocation rule the gradients of µ 1 (s) and µ 2 (s) must be, roughly speaking, co-directional on this submanifold. For generic µ i (s) it is impossible to satisfy (i) and (ii). Thus, when there are two agents and two outcomes, non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanisms do not exist for generic utilities.
Jehiel et al. then assert that the non-existence result "immediately generalizes as this 2 by 2 model is naturally embedded in every model with more agents and alternatives." While the two by two model is naturally embedded in every model the non-existence result does not generalize. Even when there are only two agents and two outcomes, the argument summarized in the preceding paragraph depends on the assumption that each agent is not indifferent between the two outcomes a 1 and a 2 (or to be exact, for utilities which are generic in the space they consider agents are not indifferent between these two outcomes). Suppose we add a third outcome, a 0 , to Jehiel et al.'s model. For their argument to extend it must be case that each agent is not indifferent between any two of the three outcomes. However, this assumption is 8 Thus, in the above example, we restrict attention to mechanisms which allocate the object to a buyer at every information state s and µ 1 (s) = V 1 (s), µ 2 (s) = −V 2 (s). 9 Hereafter, this condition is referred to as the boundary is of full dimension.
not satisfied in the above example where at every information state buyer i, i = 1, 2, is indifferent between a 0 and a j , j = i.
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Therefore, consider a setting with two agents and three outcomes a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 . Suppose that a 0 (s) ∼ 1 a 2 (s), ∀s (i.e., agent 1 is indifferent between a 0 and a 2 in every information state) and a 0 (s) ∼ 2 a 1 (s), ∀s. This condition is satisfied in the allocation of a single object to (at most) one of two buyers, provided that there are no consumption externalities. Now consider a non-trivial allocation rule h that yields each of the three outcomes a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 . All that Jehiel et al.'s theorem implies is that if h is ex post incentive compatible then the boundary between the h −1 (a 1 ) and h −1 (a 2 ) has less than full dimension. Their theorem does not impose any restriction on the dimensionality of the boundary between a 0 and a i , i = 1, 2. In particular, the possibility that h partitions S as shown in Figure 1b is not ruled out. In fact, this figure is a schematic representation of Example 1 where we demonstrated existence of an ex post incentive compatible mechanism in which the boundary between h −1 (a 1 ) and h −1 (a 2 ) is a one dimensional set in S and the projection onto S i of points on the boundary with a fixed value of s j is a single point.
More generally, suppose there are i = 1, 2, ..., n agents and L outcomes labeled a , = 1, 2, ..., L. Suppose that for some outcome a there exists an outcome a k and an agent j (where a k may depend on a and j may depend on a and a k ) such that
Then, for any ex post incentive compatible allocation rule h, the Jehiel et al. theorem places no restriction on the boundary between h −1 (a ) and h −1 (a k ). Generic existence of a non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanism with outcomes a and a k is not precluded by the Jehiel et al. theorem when (5) is satisfied.
Consider the allocation of a bundle of private goods to n buyers. Each outcome is an assignment of objects among the n buyers, where we allow the possibility that not all objects are allocated to the buyers. Let a be any assignment and let a k be another assignment which differs from a only in the allocation that buyer j receives.
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Condition (5) is satisfied for each assignment a . A full range ex post incentive compatible mechanism is a possibility.
12
10 In Example 1, apart from mechanisms with three outcomes described above, there also exist ex post incentive compatible mechanisms with two outcomes a 0 and, say, a 1 .
11 Thus, not all the objects are allocated in at least one of the two assignments a , a k . 12 A mechanism has full range if each outcome is implemented at a positive measure of information states.
The main result
We prove an existence theorem for non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanisms for the allocation of a single object when buyers have multi-dimensional signals. The starting point is the model described in Section 2. First, we assume that higher signals correspond to better news. That is, players' reservation value do not decreases with buyer signals.
13 In order to simplify the proofs, we also assume that buyers' reservation values are continuous.
Assumption 1a: V i (s) is non-decreasing in s, i = 1, 2.
1b: V i (·) is continuous in all its arguments.
The next assumption is a generalization of the single crossing property.
Assumption 2: For any s j we have
As buyer i's signal increases from s i to s i , the increase in i's value is greater than the increase in buyer j's value. This is a requirement that buyer i's value is more sensitive than buyer j's value to changes in buyer i's signal. In a model with one dimensional signals, Assumption 2 is the single crossing property, which is a sufficient condition for existence of an efficient mechanism in such models (see Maskin 1992 ).
The next assumption avoids trivialities. If this assumption is violated, then there is a buyer i whose valuation is always (weakly) greater than the other buyer j's valuation; therefore the efficient rule (which is to always allocate the object to buyer i) is both trivial and ex post incentive compatible.
Assumption 3: For each buyer, there exists a positive measure of information states at which this buyer's valuation is strictly greater than the other buyer's valuation.
With Assumptions 1 and 2, we construct a personalized price function for each buyer. This pair of price functions is shown to satisfy (3) and is used to define an ex post incentive compatible mechanism. Assumption 3 will imply that this ex post incentive compatible mechanism is non-trivial.
Fix buyer j's signal at some level s j . The domain of s i , i = j, is the unit cube in
+ and each buyer's valuation is non-decreasing in s i . Therefore, with buyer j's signal 13 The following terminology regarding monotonicity of a function f : n → R is adopted. For x, x ∈ n , x > x denotes that x is at least as large as x in every co-ordinate and x = x. If f (x ) ≥ f (x) whenever x > x then f is non-decreasing.
14 An equivalent assumption is that for each
at s j , the maximum of either buyer's reservation value as a function of buyer i's signal is attained when s i = 1, where 1 denotes the point (1, 1, . .., 1) in
Similarly, the minimum of either buyer's value as a function of s i is attained at s i = 0 ≡ (0, 0, ..., 0). Define the set of signals of buyer i which lead to the same reservation value for buyer i as signalŝ i = λ1:
Thus, for a fixed s j , buyer i's signal space partitions into equivalence classes or "indifference" curves, S i (λ, s j ), one for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. For fixed s j , equivalence classes are naturally ordered by λ as larger λ leads to larger buyer i reservation values.
While buyer i's value (as a function of s i ) is constant on S i (λ, s j ), buyer j's value will, in general, not be constant on this set. The maximum of buyer j's value on buyer i's equivalence class
As S i is compact and
exists and is continuous in λ and
For a fixed realization of s j , Figure 2 depicts indifference curves (i.e., equivalence classes) of buyers i and j in buyer i's (two dimensional) signal space. By Assumption 1a, indifference curves will be negatively sloped. However, they need not be convex and, as would be case in Example 1, they may touch the axes. V m ij (λ, s j ), the maximum value of buyer j in buyer i's equivalence class S i (λ, s j ), may be attained at more than one value.
Ex post incentive compatibility imposes the following necessary condition. If buyer 1, say, is allocated the object at information state (s 1 , s 2 ), then he should also be allocated the object at any information state (s 1 , s 2 ) such that V 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) > V 1 (s 1 , s 2 ). Otherwise, buyer 1 would have an incentive to report s 1 instead of s 1 at the information state (s 1 , s 2 ). That is, an incentive compatible allocation rule must be non-decreasing in the marginal utility (NDMU) of the buyers.
15 Or in the terminology of equivalence classes, if s 1 ∈ S 1 (λ, s 2 ) and buyer 1 is allocated the object at (s 1 , s 2 ), then buyer 1 must be allocated the object at all s 1 ∈ S 1 (λ , s 2 ) where λ > λ.
We construct an ex post incentive compatible mechanism in which, for each value of s j , there exists a λ * ij (s j ) ∈ [0, 1] such that buyer i wins if his signal is in an equivalence class greater than λ * ij (s j ), and buyer i loses otherwise. Clearly, this allocation rule satisfies NDMU. Call S i (λ * ij (s j ), s j ) the pivotal equivalence class for buyer i at s j . (Any s i in the pivotal equivalence class is a pivotal signal for buyer i.) Buyer i's personalized price is defined to be his value on the pivotal equivalence class. The next lemma is used to prove that personalized prices defined in this manner are admissible. It states that as buyer i's signal increases from equivalence class λ to equivalence class λ , the increase in i's value is at least as great as the increase in the maximum of buyer j's value on these two equivalence classes.
Lemma 2: For any s j and 1 ≥ λ > λ > 0,
Proof: To simplify notation, we write s Figure 2 illustrates the proof.
is a continuous function of x, and therefore there exists λ
where the first inequality follows from the fact that λ m s m ij (λ ) ∈ S i (λ, s j ) and (6), and the second inequality from Assumption 2.
Lemma 2 implies that g ij (λ; s j ) is a non-decreasing function of λ. The continuity of V i and of V m ij implies that g ij (λ; s j ) is a continuous function. Thus, the following is well-defined:
be buyer i's personalized price as a function of s j .
Let λ i (s i , s j ) be the index of the equivalence class that s i belongs to at s j . That is, s i ∈ S i (λ i (s i , s j ), s j ). The main result shows that the following allocation rule is non-trivial and ex post incentive compatible: buyer i wins if and only if
This rule is implemented through the personalized prices defined above.
Theorem: The personalized prices t * = (t * 1 , t * 2 ) defined in (7) are admissible. The mechanism (h * , t * ), where h * implements t * , is non-trivial and ex post incentive compatible.
Proof: Suppose that the information state is (s 1 , s 2 ). We write λ i instead of λ i (s i , s j ) to simplify the notation. That is,
Suppose that 
Thus, the personalized prices satisfy (3). Therefore, by Lemma 1, the allocation rule
which implements admissible prices t * 1 (s 2 ), t * 2 (s 1 ) is feasible and ex post incentive compatible.
To complete the proof, we show that the mechanism is non-trivial. Let information state s 1 = (s 2 ) at which buyer 1's value is strictly greater than than buyer 2's value, there is a positive of information states at which buyer 1 is allocated the object. A similar argument establishes that buyer 2 is allocated the object at a positive measure of information states. Hence, the mechanism is non-trivial.
This mechanism is weakly efficient in the sense that if the object is assigned to a buyer then this buyer must have the highest reservation value. To see this, suppose that buyer i is allocated the object at information state s = (s i , s j ). Let λ i (s i , s j ) and λ * ij (s j ) be defined at this state in the usual manner. Then, from the proof of the theorem it is clear that
From Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) we know that this mechanism cannot be efficient. This may also be verified directly: neither buyer is allocated the object at information states s = (s i , s j ) such that λ i (s) ≤ λ * ij (s j ) and λ j (s) ≤ λ * ji (s i ). Such information states have positive measure (provided, of course, that Assumption 3 is satisfied).
Recall that any signal s i in the pivotal equivalence class S i (λ * ij , s j ) is a pivotal signal for buyer i at s j . With bidder j's signal fixed at s j , buyer i wins (loses) at signals greater (less) than a pivotal signal. Thus a pivotal signal is an infimum of winning signals. The price paid by a winning buyer i equals the valuation of this buyer at a pivotal signal. This is similar to the efficient mechanisms in Ausubel (1999) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , where buyers have one dimensional signals.
17 However, unlike in these models, in the mechanism of the above theorem the valuations of buyers i and j need not be equal at a pivotal signal of buyer i; at a pivotal signal for buyer i, buyer i's valuation equals the most that buyer j's valuation can be in the pivotal equivalence class of buyer i. The difference arises because in one dimensional models, equivalence classes (or indifference curves) of buyer i signals are singletons and hence for a given realization of s j there can be only one pivotal signal for bidder i. A second difference is the role of the single crossing property or Assumption 2. With one dimensional signals, the single crossing property is sufficient for existence of an efficient ex post incentive compatible mechanism whereas with multi-dimensional signals Assumption 2 is sufficient for the existence of an ex post incentive compatible mechanism mechanism (which, as already noted, satisfies only a weak form of efficiency).
Extension to many buyers
We outline the minor changes in notation, assumptions, and analysis required to extend the existence theorem to n > 2 buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on the (possibly multi-dimensional) signals of all n buyers. The information states are denoted s = (s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n ) = (s i , s −i ). Change s j to s −i in Assumption 2, and require the assumption to hold for every V i and V j . Assumption 3 is required to hold for two distinct buyers, i.e., there exist two sets of information states, Once again, buyer i's personalized price equals his valuation at a pivotal signal which equals the maximum valuation of all other buyers on the pivotal equivalence class.
Concluding Remarks
If there are no consumption externalities, then Jehiel et al. (2004) does not rule out ex post implementation when buyers have multi-dimensional information and interdependent values. We established that in a simple private goods model in which an indivisible object is allocated to one among several buyers, an ex post incentive compatible mechanism exists when agents have multi-dimensional information. Existence was proved under the assumption that buyers' information satisfies a generalization of the single crossing property. The mechanism shares the feature with the generalized Vickrey auction of single dimensional information models that the price paid by the winning buyer is equal to this buyer's value at the lowest possible signal (equivalence class) at which this buyer would just win.
Selfish preferences are a natural assumption for private goods models. At a tiny perturbation of preferences away from selfish preferences, (5) Two alternatives Three alternatives Figure 1a Figure 1b
